Crofting Law Group Conference 2017 – Reflections of an Aberdeen law student delegate

This blog post is by Simon Boendermaker, a recent LLB (Hons) graduate of the University of Aberdeen. Comments from Brian Inkster, Hon. Secretary of the Crofting Law Group, and Malcolm Combe follow.

Recently I had the opportunity to attend the Crofting Law Group Annual Conference, this year held in Stornoway on the Isle of Lewis, thanks to the generosity of the Group providing free student tickets and subsidised travel and accommodation.

As my Honours courses at the School of Law included both the Rural Law and Law of Leases courses (co-ordinated by Malcolm Combe and Douglas Bain respectively), I did not want to miss the opportunity to take part in an event which appealed to my interests. Alongside this, the programme for the conference featured an afternoon of events dedicated to common grazings, which had been the subject of considerable controversy in crofting communities in the previous twelve months. The opportunity to see vigorous debate between the newly elected crofting commissioners and representatives of the Upper Coll and Mangersta grazings committees, who had been sorely affected by the actions of their predecessors, made for a captivating agenda.

The conference took place in the picturesque surroundings of Lews Castle, the ideal setting to soak in my first visit to the Hebrides. However, there was little time to admire the scenery as a packed schedule of events began with a warm welcome from Iain Maciver of the Stornoway Trust (the community landowner of property in and around Stornoway), followed by a brief introduction to the day’s events from Duncan MacPhee, vice chairman of the Crofting Law Group.

As the programme of the conference would focus on crofting law reform, Fergus Ewing, the Cabinet Secretary for the Rural Economy and Connectivity, gave a brief video outline of the stance of the Scottish Government on current legislation. Ewing highlighted that the Scottish Government agreed with the views of crofters that the law was in need of reform, expressing sympathy with the view that legislation had become overly complex for the average crofter. He also revealed that the Government was engaging with crofters over the direction that reform would take, with one approach being to consolidate legislation into a simpler Act or alternatively to adopt a clean sheet approach and developing a completely new legislative framework. However, his comments were tempered by his acknowledgement that the government currently has several “legislative priorities” which meant that crofting would be balanced alongside several competing interests.

The clean sheet approach which was mentioned by Fergus Ewing was rejected by Patrick Krause and Russell Smith, chief executive and chair of the Scottish Crofting Federation. Both noted that legislative reform was low on the list of priorities of the average crofter and that they were generally concerned with areas of practical concern, such as decrofting (that being the term used for taking land out of crofting regulation) and assignation (transfer). Smith noted that a clean sheet approach would risk “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”

Much discussion followed the next item on the agenda, when Duncan MacPhee revealed he had successfully arranged a standard security (the Scots law term for a mortgage) over an entire croft without the need to decroft the house and restrict the scope of the security to the decrofted land alone.

Bill Barron of the Crofting Commission discussed “a year like no other” for the Commission, stating that the previous board of the Commission had witnessed deep personal splits, which had led to it failing to act as a corporate body. Barron said he was keen to learn from the mistakes of the previous year, where members of the Commission had made individual regulatory decisions which had resulted in the breakdown of trust between individual crofters and the Commission. With regard to crofting law reform, Barron insisted that the Commission would work with the Government to ensure that any new legislation would support opportunity for new entrants, an area which urgently required examination to secure the future of the sector. Finally, he expressed a hope that, with time, the Commission would be trusted to work for crofters once again.

After lunch, where I was able to speak further with Barron about his plans for the future of the Commission after the previous twelve months, Brian Inkster gave a presentation on the controversy surrounding the Commission. A complete chronology of that could take up several blog posts: Inkster’s Crofting Law Blog provides exactly that, so those interested in further reading on that topic are directed there.

The final portion of the day gave crofters a chance to discuss the current situation surrounding common grazings. Calum Maclean from Upper Coll gave a passionate account of the previous twelve months from the perspective of the grazings committee on Upper Coll. He could not understand how Barron and the new Crofting Commission could be expected to win back the trust of ordinary crofters when they had done little to actively address the effects of the decisions of the previous Commissioners in 2016. However, he was able to finish by stating that ordinary crofters did not want to abandon the current framework but that serious work would be required to secure the future of the sector.

Crofting Law Group Discussion
A discussion during the conference.

The lively debate provoked by the afternoon’s discussions continued well into the evening, when I spoke to several crofters who had attended the conference over dinner and gained some invaluable insights from these conversations. A desire for reform was evident and it is clear that stakeholders will need to undertake serious engagement to secure the bright new future that crofting is desperately in need of.

After writing my dissertation on agricultural holdings, I was able to draw a number of parallels throughout the day between the situation of crofters and issues faced in the agricultural holdings sector, where secure tenants also benefit from a parcel of rights (some which are particularly strong, perhaps even stronger than the rights of the landowner). All of this has ongoing implications for the wider rural sector. For my part, the conference and indeed the discussions over dinner brought to life some of the issues that had been discussed in my law degree. Thanks again to the Crofting Law Group for providing me with the opportunity to attend this year’s conference. I would not hesitate to recommend future conferences to other interested students.

Comment from Brian Inkster

We have been running the assisted places scheme to our conferences for law students at the Universities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Strathclyde for a few years now. It has been very well received by the Universities. It gives their students an opportunity to find out more about crofting law, a subject seldom touched upon at university. It is hoped that this exposure to crofting law may encourage those students to become tomorrow’s crofting lawyers. The Crofting Law Group will continue the assisted places scheme for next year’s conference which will be held in Edinburgh.

Comment from Malcolm Combe

The University of Aberdeen is very grateful to the Crofting Law Group for the support it gives to students from across Scotland. Whilst some courses at the Scottish universities touch on crofting matters, even with the best will in the world there is no way we could replicate a programme of events akin to the Crofting Law Group Conference for students to benefit from. We look forward to working with the Crofting Law Group in future, and if any other conferencing organisations would be interested in offering a similar student support scheme  we at the School of Law would be delighted to hear from you.

Crofting Students
From left to right: Brian Inkster (Secretary CLG), George MacDonald (Committee member CLG), Maureen Duffy (University of Strathclyde), Duncan MacPhee (Vice Chair CLG), Andrew Agnew (Dundee University), Fraser McDonald (Edinburgh University), Simon Boendermaker (University of Aberdeen), Gemma Thomson (University of Glasgow), Iain Maciver (Committee member CLG).

 

Advertisements

When non-discrimination is discriminatory: A Comment on the Maltese Marriage Equality Bill

This blog post is by Justin Borg-Barthet. It was originally posted on ‘Manuel Delia’s notes’, a Maltese political blog. It is re-posted here (with minor amendments) with kind permission.

Through the Marriage Equality Bill, Malta joins a small group of European nations which have both met and exceeded the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of the elimination of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. It is particularly noteworthy that this development has met with the approval of all parties in the Maltese Parliament. This has not always been the case in other jurisdictions.

Malta also differs from its peers, however, in that it appears that political expediency has resulted in laws which have not been as carefully crafted as one might have hoped. Scots law on marriage equality, for example, developed following extensive public debate, with the benefit of significant academic input, and through careful legal drafting. The law is therefore clear, and same-sex couples are as aware of their rights and obligations as their different sex counterparts.

While Maltese law is driven by a dynamic, narrow human rights agenda, this appears to have occurred to the detriment of careful consideration of family law matters. Like the Civil Unions Act 2014 before it, the Marriage Equality Bill superimposes a heterosexual model on same-sex relationships. This is intended to achieve equality of rights, but in some cases results in a poor fit, to the detriment of same-sex couples. I will highlight two examples below, namely impotence and consummation.

Impotence

The lack of consideration for differences between heterosexual and same-sex models is most evident in relation to matters pertaining to sexual relations. In particular, the Maltese Marriage Act 1975 provides that a marriage shall be void ‘if either of the parties is impotent, whether such impotence is absolute or relative’. There is no distinction in the Maltese Bill between same-sex couples and couples of different genders.

This is to be contrasted with Scots Law, as well as the law of England and Wales. The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, for example, provides as follows:

For the avoidance of doubt, the rule of law which provides for a marriage to be voidable by reason of impotence has effect only in relation to a marriage between persons of different sexes.

The exclusion of impotence as a ground for nullity in same-sex relations in Scotland is motivated by the different realities of same-sex and different sex couples. The relevance of the stipulation that impotence is a ground for nullity is plain for spouses of different genders. After all, the provision was designed with them in mind.

For same-sex partners, however, it is not necessarily the case that impotence as traditionally understood is relevant to both, or indeed either, partner. Suffice it to note that intercourse between two women differs from that between a man and a woman. Similarly, intercourse between two men does not necessarily require both men’s bodies to function identically. Maltese law does not account for this.

Consummation

Equally problematic for same-sex couples is the regulation of consummation of marriage in Malta. This too differs from Scots law. In Malta, the absence of consummation within three months may result in annulment. Article 19A(1) of the Maltese Marriage Act 1975 provides as follows:

A valid marriage may be annulled at the request of one of the spouses on the grounds that the other party has refused to consummate the same.

It is especially unclear what constitutes consummation between two women, or indeed whether it is possible in the sense the law intended. Nor is it entirely clear what is meant by consummation for male couples. One might assume that penetration by one spouse of the other should constitute consummation. But it is equally arguable that one spouse could seek to annul the marriage where penetration occurred by one party but was ‘refused’ by the other.

All that is certain is that same-sex couples cannot be certain of the validity of their marriages.

Concluding remarks

The likely legal fallout could have been avoided given the successful foreign legislative models and external expertise available to the Maltese legislator. It is regrettable that it is precisely those whose rights were to be furthered who will suffer from a lack of foresight.

The resulting legal uncertainty will, of course, have no effect whatsoever on different sex couples. The law is clear in their regard. Contrary to arguments raised in the Maltese Parliament, to distinguish between different and same-sex couples is the very antithesis of discrimination. Maltese law discriminates by failing to account for differences. Same-sex couples in Malta are rendered vulnerable to a lack of foreseeability as to the meaning of the law.

It is the same-sex couples purportedly protected by identical treatment who are in fact vulnerable to a lack of certainty. It is same-sex couples who are vulnerable to spousal abuse arising from a lack of clarity in a marital contract in which the parties’ rights and duties are undefined. And it is same-sex couples who will have to suffer the emotional and financial burden of litigating points of law which the legislator appears not to have considered.

Raptor Persecutions & Prosecutions Take 2: How investigatory powers legislation read with human rights requirements might explain recent COPFS decision-making

This post is by Dr Phil Glover.

As an academic opposed to wildlife crime and with no ‘huntin/shootin/fishin’ interests (or indeed abilities) to declare, I have penned this article as a follow up response to my colleague Professor Peter Duff’s recent contribution to this blog relating to the correctness of recent Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) decisions not to prosecute in some recent wildlife crime cases. His piece stimulated robust debate on the emotive issue of wildlife crime and the admissibility of evidence pertaining to it, an issue that I wholeheartedly agree is crying out for greater legal (and legislative) certainty in Scotland and the UK. A number of the comments posted on the Raptor Persecution Scotland blog following Professor Duff’s article reflect complex research issues currently vexing me and on which I am seeking comments. As the academic responsible for Professor Duff’s references to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (RIP(S)A) and the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) I feel it is necessary to expand upon them in light of some of the comments they have received.

The comments reflected questions I believe the COPFS would have to address in their decision-making. Some of them were partially (but in my view incompletely) addressed in a very helpful COPFS letter (PDF) of 30 May 2017 to Graeme Dey MSP (in his capacity as Convener of the Scottish Parliament’s Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee). This article provides my arguably fuller answers and a suggestion or two as to how the current impasse or inconsistency in achieving successful prosecutions might be achieved.

Assuming no disingenuousness as to their purposes on the part of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), it appears settled that its conduct in the controversial cases involved covertly placing and subsequently monitoring video-recording (data capturing) equipment adjacent to vulnerable wildlife sites for the (laudable) purpose (sole or otherwise) of processing the recorded film so as to provide Police Scotland and the COPFS with evidence identifying persons committing crimes against wildlife. On my admittedly skim reading of the cases referred to it appears that it is the RSPB, rather than Police Scotland, who undertakes the covert investigatory conduct. If not, disregard much of the analysis that now flows.

What are the legal implications of the RSPB’s conduct?

The legal implications of the RSPB’s conduct depend on the interpretation of two distinct legislative regimes that arguably apply.

The older, clearer, obviously applicable regime is that within the DPA. My PhD thesis concluded, inter alia, that virtually all forms of covert surveillance as commonly understood can be deconstructed to be reconceptualised as covert investigative data acquisition. Data acquisition and subsequent processing includes video recording of camera images and their subsequent use-  (Peck v United Kingdom, (2003) 36 EHRR 41 at [59] ) An excellent synopsis of the applicability of the DPA 1998 as regards the acquisition and processing of video recorded personal data in Scots law can be found in the recent case of Anthony & Deborah Woolley v Nahid Akbar or Akram [2017] SC Edin 7 (at paragraphs 72-74). For present purposes however, evidence suggests the RSPB are self-declared registered data controllers and data processors within the meaning of section 1 of the DPA insofar as they manage members’ personal data (defined in Section 1 of the DPA as … data which relate to a living individual who can be identified—(a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller. Their role as controllers mandates them (DPA, s4(4)) to comply with all the data protection principles (DPA, Schedules 1-4 according to context).

Initial inspection suggests that the first principle has the most relevance:

(1) Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless

(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.

In the context of the present analysis, the relevant Schedule 2 conditions are:

  • that the subject of the personal data has consented to the processing (not realistic in investigative covert information acquisition) OR
  • the data processing is necessary for the administration of justice OR
  • for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, OR
  • for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.

Schedule 3(6) additionally provides that sensitive personal data may be processed where such processing is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings), and 3(7) replicates the permissions in Schedule 2 regarding administration of justice etc.

On this reading, the registered data controller (here the RSPB) can lawfully obtain and process personal data tending to identify a living wildlife offender for these purposes under the DPA and its principles. Added weight to this assertion can be given by the fact that section 29 of the DPA provides, inter alia, that personal data processed for (a) the prevention or detection of crime or (b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders are exempt from the first data protection principle (except to the extent to which it requires compliance with the conditions in Schedules 2 and 3).

If it is lawful, necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (prevention of wildlife crime)  it is also ECHR compliant. Within the DPA regime therefore, all looks rosy for evidence of wildlife crime obtained and processed by the RSPB using covert investigative technical measures.

My view however, is that a second, more modern legal regime applies, namely that within the RIP(S)A. (HOLD THAT ‘PUBLIC AUTHORITY’ ARGUMENT, I WILL DEAL WITH IT!) The RSPB’s conduct directly equates to ‘directed surveillance’ as defined in RIP(S)A 2000, s1(2), namely covert, non-intrusive surveillance undertaken for the purposes of a specific operation or a specific investigation in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person. The same section (at s1(8)(a)) additionally provides that ‘surveillance is covert if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place’. Meanwhile, ‘Private information in relation to a person, includes any information relating to the person’s private or family life’ (s1(9).

The term ‘equates to’ is not chosen lightly. This is because the RIP(S)A further provides that conduct amounting to directed surveillance shall be ‘lawful for all purposes if authorised’ (s5(1)) and that such an authorisation can only be issued by a ‘designated person’ (s6) within a ‘relevant public authority’ (s8). Inspection of s8 reveals that ‘relevant public authority’ does not include the RSPB. The RIP(S)A definitions for conduct amounting to covert directed (and intrusive) surveillance clearly state that such definitions apply only for the purposes of that Act (s1). Covert investigative conduct outside the RIP(S)A is not ‘surveillance’ within the meaning of the Act.

One initial view therefore might be that the RSPB’s covert investigative conduct as a ‘non-public authority’ takes place outside any statutory regime and therefore outside any European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) safeguards. This view would mean that all the purportedly ECHR-compliant provisions of the RIP(S)A 2000 vis a vis ‘directed surveillance’ do not apply and are non-enforceable against the RSPB, meaning that their acquisition of private information about persons via covert video recording (in these cases the images enabling the identification of the alleged offenders) did not require to be authorised and would ultimately be admissible under the Scots law of evidence as no more than ‘irregularly’ obtained. This cannot in my view be correct, and I infer from their reference to ‘not authorised’ in their letter that the COPFS agree with me. Here’s why.

Strict adherence to this view creates the anomaly, indeed absurdity, that if it were Police Scotland covertly placing the video data-capturing equipment in identical circumstances to the RSPB for the same purpose (prevention of crime), an authorisation under s6 of the RIP(S)A, issuable only after strict considerations of the investigation or operation’s necessity and proportionality would be required, with the very real risk that if not issued, the evidence would be rendered unlawfully obtained and therefore inadmissible. Police Scotland have not been immune to severe censure for failure to adhere to RIP(S)A’s authorisation matrix (David Moran & Others v Police Scotland, IPT/15/602/CH, IPT/15/603 CH, IPT/15/613/CH, IPT/16/263/CH, IPT/16/264/CH, IPT/16/387/CH) It seems unthinkable therefore, that even before reading the Human Rights Act 1998 alongside the RIP(S)A, evidence obtained via covert investigative activity outside the RIP(S)A mechanism and safeguards would be considered lawfully acquired. If it were, Police Scotland would simply be able to ‘contract out’ of their ECHR-compliance obligations regarding covert surveillance by allowing non-State actors such as the RSPB to undertake it for them when it suited.

European Human Rights Expectations

Unsurprisingly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made decisions that acknowledge this potential circumvention. Simon McKay, author of Covert Policing Law and Practice (OUP, 2011) outlines in Chapter 10 (Private Surveillance) the decisions in MM v The Netherlands (2004) 39 EHRR 19 and Van Vondel v The Netherlands (Application No 38258/03, 25 January 2008) holding that investigating authorities cannot evade their ECHR responsibilities by the use of evidence obtained by non-State or ‘private’ agents. Crucially, in MM the police and the public prosecutor ‘made a crucial contribution’ to the eventual criminal proceedings, thus engaging the responsibility of the State. It is highly likely that the COPFS, as Scotland’s public prosecutor, would be held as being similarly engaged and therefore responsible for flaws in the human rights compliance of surveillance undertaken outside the RIP(S)A. It is this consideration of the implicit failure of the RSPB to adhere to the RIP(S)A, by seeking authorisation from Police Scotland to undertake ‘directed surveillance’ on an agency basis, that may have influenced the COPFS decision not to prosecute in the recent cases referred to. In my view the COPFS would be correct to consider this, as it seems unacceptable that public authorities are bound by the RIP(S)A compliance safeguards whilst bodies such as the RSPB remain currently exempt.

In the absence of a rapid amendment to the RIP(S)A, a simple solution to this problem, if no one has already thought of it, would be for the RSPB to engage Police Scotland in the practical implementation of covert investigative conduct, with Police Scotland taking all the relevant requisite steps under the RIP(S)A to ensure ECHR compliance and thus the lawfulness of the conduct. This might involve no more than the secondment of a Police Scotland operative to ‘supervise’ the RSPB investigation teams, but with the necessary RIP(S)A authorisations in place.

When considering the notion of amending legislation, a question arises as to whether the RSPB could or should be added to the ‘relevant public authority’ taxonomy in the RIP(S)A, s8(3) so as to enable them to authorise their conduct in ECHR-compliant terms. Regrettably, due to my favourite bugbear (legislative drafting), this could be problematic: section 8(4) provides that the Scottish Ministers may by order amend section 8(3) by adding or removing a ‘public authority’, but there is no provision for adding entities such as the RSPB that fall outside the ‘public authority’ definition.

At this point it can be noted that nailing down a set definition for ‘public authority’ appears beyond the UK and Scottish legislatures and is purpose-dependent.

The RSPB does not constitute a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, Schedule 1, but can be designated as such under that Act (s4 and s5(2)). This point is worth expanding upon: s4 empowers the Scottish Ministers to amend Schedule 1 by adding or removing particular ‘bodies’, with s5(2) further empowering them to ‘designate as a Scottish public authority for the purposes of this Act any person mentioned in subsection (2) who (a) is neither for the time being listed in schedule 1 nor capable of being added to that schedule by order under section 4(1); and (b) is neither a public body nor the holder of any public office’. Subsection 2 provides that such persons include, inter alia, those who ‘appear to the Scottish Ministers to exercise functions of a public nature’. It seems strange that legislative drafting has enabled this here, but not in the RIP(S)A.

A further argument for applying the RIP(S)A – Domestic Human Rights Expectations

The arguably overarching Human Rights Act 1998 mandates: that courts and tribunals must take into account, inter alia, any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights (s2); that so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights (s3) and that “public authority” includes—(a) a court or tribunal, and (b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature (s6(3)(b)).

The first point therefore is that the RIP(S)A must be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the Article 6 right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence and the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. One possible outcome of this is that the RIP(S)A cannot be read in such a way as to render directed surveillance by bodies not designated as relevant public authorities and that a section 4 declaration of incompatibility might be required. Another is that section 8 could be ‘read down’ to include all bodies exercising functions of a public nature.

Examples abound of jurisprudence and associated academic commentary on what constitutes ‘functions of a public nature’. To my knowledge, and subject to the caveat that airing a hasty academic legal opinion can leave gaps in analysis, covert investigative information acquisition equating to covert directed surveillance under the RIP(S)A conducted by a registered charity has not yet been the subject of domestic or European legal challenge. Given the Strasbourg jurisprudence already mentioned however, I am of the view that such conduct would be construed as ‘of a public nature’ and would render the RSPB a ‘public authority’ for RIP(S)A purposes. Put another way, I believe that the RIP(S)A would be ‘read down’ to incorporate conduct amounting to covert directed surveillance on the part of any body undertaking conduct amounting to covert investigative information acquisition that assists the State (in this case the COPFS) in bringing a prosecution. This would undoubtedly require the RSPB and similar bodies to seek an authorisation under the RIP(S)A by involving Police Scotland as outlined previously.

Conclusions

What we are left with then, is that the COPFS, when weighing up whether or not to lead evidence comprising recorded video data acquired covertly for investigative purposes by an organisation not currently recognised in law as a public authority, have to consider the effect of two distinct regimes. The first, ‘older’ regime is that within the DPA, in which the RSPB as a lawful registered data controller, processes data acquired covertly for a purpose exempted under s29 from a requirement to be fair and lawful and which will therefore be processed lawfully in the course of prospective legal proceedings and appears admissible. The second, ‘newer’ regime is that framed by an inadequately drafted RIP(S)A read, as it must now be read, with the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. On this reading, the RSPB cannot currently lawfully undertake conduct amounting to lawful directed surveillance.

Having revisited the limited available published information surrounding the Colin Marshall case (heard in 2006), I am of the view that the Sheriff erred in admitting evidence of what may have started out as a nest surveillance, but what ended up as being directed surveillance of Marshall over 3 nights in 2003. There is no indication that the RIP(S)A was even considered. The second case, that of Mutch, similarly involves no recorded discussion of the RIP(S)A or the Sheriff’s view on its applicability. It is my respectful view that the Sheriff’s decision here was courageous and taken for public policy reasons, but that it either ignored or circumvented the applicable law (the RIP(S)A) albeit for laudable reasons. It is a disingenuous and ultimately untenable position to assert that an ‘RSPB investigation team’ (their description, not mine) monitors nests as part of a survey and captures/processes video evidence of criminality as a ‘by-product’ of that survey. It is my belief that the COPFS feel the same and are therefore unfortunately bound to discount video recorded evidence if it has been obtained by investigation teams not listed as public authorities in RIP(S)A s8. Consequently, in my view, the answer lies in ‘contracting’ directed surveillance of vulnerable sites back to Police Scotland, seconding Police Scotland personnel to supervise RSPB investigation teams, or in the longer term amending the RIP(S)A after suitable public consultation.

It is understandable that champions for wildlife protection will feel frustrated at inconsistencies in the bringing of criminal proceedings and that courts represent the best and most transparent arbiter on matters of admissibility. However it is not the role or function of Scottish courts to decide whether or not to prosecute. That thankfully wholly independent decision is for COPFS. Having weighed the evidence that has been obtained outside the requirements for lawful, authorised, directed surveillance conduct and therefore outside the guaranteed ECHR compliance, the COPFS are probably right to err on the side of caution and avoid risking widespread public censure for abuse of process. Bodies such as the RSPB, in the short-term absence of them being added to the RIP(S)A mechanisms, should engage with Police Scotland to ensure lawful RIP(S)A and Human Rights Act 1998 compliance. In the mid- to longer term, those in government entrusted with wildlife protection should be lobbying vigorously to have the RIP(S)A amended to incorporate the RSPB, in the same manner as SEPA. Wildlife crime is too serious not be prosecuted, but the overarching requirement under ECHR Article 6 that proceedings be fair mandates that evidence acquisition must be lawful, on a legal basis, necessary and proportionate.

Right Process in Sharing Nile Water Resources: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

The World Water Congress is held under the auspices of the 50 year old International Water Resources Association (IWRA), in collaboration with governments. The Congress attracts hundreds of academics, practitioners, policy makers and members of civil society organisations working on water related issues at global, regional and national levels.

The 16th Congress was hosted by the Mexican Government in Cancun between 29 May and 3 June 2017, under the theme ‘Bridging Science and Policy’.  After intensive discussions in the forms of plenaries, high-level panel and special sessions on various aspects of water followed, including: the water-energy-food nexus; water and the Sustainable Development Goals; water and business; water for peace; water policy and governance; water and climate and science and international law. The Congress then adopted the Cancun Declaration (PDF), entitled ‘A Call for Action to Bridge Science and Water Policy-Making for Sustainable Development’.

The Declaration:

calls for urgent mobilization of knowledge generators, governments, donors, professionals and civil society to join their efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. Water is one of the most crucial needs for the Earth and all of its inhabitants. The holistic ambition of sustainable development in a changing world needs multidisciplinary knowledge, evidence based policies, involvement and participation of everybody for a more effective implementation of solutions.

One of the Special Sessions (SS 35) held during the Cancun Water Congress was on ‘Multi‐disciplinary perspectives on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the future of water resources management and development in the Eastern Nile Basin’.  Hosted by the Stockholm International Water Institute, Northumbria University, the University of Aberdeen, and International Centre for Water Cooperation (ICWC), this Special session covered seven papers in two separate sub-sessions.

The first part dealt with highly technical and political aspects of the subject. Experts from Oxford University, Harvard and ICWC looked at the construction, reservoir filling and operation of the Ethiopian mega dam on the Blue Nile often referred to as the GERD (which is set to generate 6000 megawatt in electricity) from hydrological, economics and political science perspectives. The second part of the Nile Special Session was primarily international law oriented.  International water law experts, practitioners and academics gave three papers exploring the legal developments in the Nile basin associated with the GERD. Chaired by the Editor-in-Chief of Water International (a prominent journal in the field), and involving panellists from the World Bank, representatives of policy makers and researchers,  a meaningful discussion was held around the key opportunities and challenges concerning the sharing and preserving of Nile water resources in general and managing the controversies surrounding the GERD in particular. All papers entertained the view that if Nile riparian countries (and particularly the three eastern Nile basin countries, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt) cooperate on the basis of scientific studies and globally accepted legal and policy standards, they will all benefit without sustaining any significant harm.

GERD

One of the papers presented in the Nile Special Session was titled ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Procedural Equity’. In this paper, the writer of this blog post and Professor Alistair Rieu-Clarke (from Northumbria, School of Law, formerly Dundee Centre for Water Law and Policy), building upon previously published work (PDF),  explored three key aspects of the role of procedural equity in relation to the GERD and the Nile more generally.

The first aspect is what Thomas Franck, an eminent public international lawyer, calls ‘procedural legitimacy’ or ‘right process’.  This aspect of equity (or fairness) is measured by the determinacy, validation, coherence and adherence of legal arrangements made by states. The concept of ‘right process’ pre-supposes that such a process is established and implemented through cooperation, consent and good faith from all concerned.

The second is that these key elements of ‘right process’ are imbedded into international watercourses law as enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention 1997 (UNWC). This includes the duty to negotiate in good faith, the duty to notify and consult on planned measures, equitable participation, the duty to take due diligence measures and settle disputes in a peaceful manner.

In light of such theoretical and normative frameworks the presenters examined old Nile treaties and post-1990 endeavours, and concluded that Nile colonial-era treaties do not provide procedural equity, the essence of which is the establishment and implementation of a ‘right process’. In contrast, the newly emerging political and legal frameworks such as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) on the sharing of Nile water resources are broadly in line with the UNWC concerning the establishment of a right process for Nile riparians. However, the CFA has only been signed by SIX Nile riparian states and ratified by THREE, whilst being strongly opposed by Egypt and by Sudan. This might be seen as an obstacle to establishing a right and equitable process. It was reflected that the participation of all concerned is key for promoting a right process, and the absence of Egypt and Sudan in the CFA process can be a serious impediment to having a right process in the Nile basin. It was equally maintained that procedural equity accommodates neither making non-negotiable claims such as ‘historic water rights’ and ‘veto powers’ over water uses by some riparian states, nor does it endorse blocking a right process of cooperative arrangement by a state or a group of states. This appears to be in line with the spirit of the UNWC.

The paper then went into the details of the third aspect of procedural equity, namely the application of the elements of a right process to the GERD. This would include the issues of prior notification and consultation, cooperation during the GERD filling and operation of the dam, and benefit sharing among the three eastern Nile basin countries (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt).  It was highlighted that, despite some significant endeavours as mentioned earlier, the absence of a Basin-wide legal framework in the Nile from which we can deduce a right process is a major challenge. Such an absence does not imply the non-application of customary principles of international law to the question of resource sharing among Nile basin riparian states. Among the key principles of international water law which are relevant to the issues related to the GERD include the principles of equitable participation, due diligence and reciprocity, as widely endorsed by the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice.

16th Congress Panel

The paper primarily relied on the right processes envisaged in the Declaration of Principles (DoPs) agreed by Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt in March 2015. The paper concluded, based upon the DoPs, that:

1) The principles of cooperation, information exchange, confidence building and peaceful settlement of disputes must constitute the basis for applying a right process with respect to the GERD.

2) The detailed commitments such as cooperating on dam filling, dam operation and benefit sharing provide clearer commitments of a right process.

3) The institutional framework that has emerged in the process resulted in the nearly regular tripartite negotiations conducted through the Technical National Committee in which the three countries are equally represented and backed by relevant ministerial and head of state/government interventions move towards a right process. (That framework has been supported by the establishment of an International Panel of Experts which was entrusted to create confidence building through conducting scientific studies and recommending solutions to the concerns of the parties. The use of two French consultancy and firms and a British legal firm to help facilitate dialogue and finalise detailed agreements is arguably another example of a right process informed by science and appropriate studies.)

It may be argued that the continuous dialogue and negotiations by the parties in accordance with the DoPs and subsequent commitments and the further actions taken by them suggest that there is a coherent, valid, and applied right process with respect to resolving the crucial issues surrounding the GERD.  There is also evidence, as clearly recognised by the DoPs, that the parties involved are negotiating in good faith. However, there are delays in finalising things, particularly regarding the studies sought to be conducted by foreign firms. There are also substantive differences that arise in the course of such a right process, which suggests that a right process cannot be fully divorced from a right substance or substantive equity.

The paper concluded that right process is as important as right substance. Although the Nile lacks a basin-level permanent right process, the NBI and the CFA appear to be heading in the right direction subject to continuous good faith negotiations among all parties. The Blue Nile case study demonstrates that good faith negotiation is a constantly evolving process. Clearly, the developments associated with the GERD have brought positive and significant dynamics in prompting procedural equity (or right process) compared with old Nile treaties. Although the parties to the DoPs are working to implement their commitments, the pace of the process could be improved. However, such developments may not be sustainable unless the GERD-related endeavour is seized as an opportunity to foster Basin-wide permanent institutions and processes that are crucial not only to promoting equitable utilisation of Nile water resources but also to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals that the Cancun Declaration rightly emphasises.

XVI World Water Congress

The law of evidence, video footage, and wildlife conservation: did COPFS make the correct decisions?

This post is by Professor Peter Duff.

Non-lawyers might be bewildered by the recent decisions of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) not to proceed with prosecution in a series of cases where the RSPB has video footage of employees of large estates setting traps for or killing protected birds of prey (as reported by BBC News here).

COPFS has stated that this is because such video footage is not admissible in evidence at a criminal trial. While this might seem to the layperson like a legal technicality, it can be argued that under the law COPFS has little choice in the matter. After all, no purpose is served in bringing prosecutions which are destined to fail because the courts will not admit the crucial evidence. A common reaction might be that ‘the law is an ass’ but there are important principles at stake which justify the position that the law currently takes towards such evidence.

As COPFS explains in a recent letter (PDF) to the Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee of the Scottish Parliament, the admissibility of evidence at criminal trials is governed generally by a substantial body of case law. COPFS states that its review of this body of law reveals that where covert cameras are placed, without the necessary authority (for example, a warrant granted by a Sheriff), for the purposes of detecting crime, the subsequent evidence has been obtained ‘irregularly’. As a general principle, this renders such evidence inadmissible in criminal proceedings according to the leading Scottish case of Lawrie v Muir 1950 JC 19, which has been cited with approval by courts all around the world. However, the judges in this case qualified this rule to some extent by stating that an irregularity in obtaining evidence can be excused depending on the nature of the irregularity and the general circumstances of the case.

The yardstick for a criminal court in determining whether an irregularity can be excused, thus allowing the evidence to be admitted at trial, is a balancing act between the ‘public interest’ in convicting those accused of crime and the need to protect the civil liberties – or, in modern terms, the human rights – of the ordinary citizen. If the latter are not given considerable weight, the fear is that we might well end up living in a police state under a ‘Gestapo’ type regime. Thus, for example, if the police irregularly seize the incriminating evidence in a very serious case, because it is at immediate risk of destruction by the perpetrator of the crime, a court might well deem that such an irregularity can be excused. On the other hand, if the police simply break down a suspect’s door in the middle of the night in a minor case to collect incriminating material because they cannot be bothered to obtain a search warrant, then the court is almost certainly not going to excuse the irregularity.

In the cases in question, we have the RSPB installing video cameras on private estates, apparently without the permission of the landowner, which is a breach of the privacy of the landowner and his or her employees who work on the estate. It seems that the RSPB claim that these cameras are placed solely for research purposes with no thought of detecting crime. It is not surprising that COPFS seems to find this explanation unconvincing because while one purpose may well be to gather research evidence – for example, as to the causes of the high attrition rate among birds of prey – it seems unlikely that the RSPB has not considered the possibility of gathering evidence of estates and their employees engaging in ‘wildlife crime’. As a non-ornithologist, I have always assumed that the long-established surveillance cameras at the Boat of Garten ospreys’ nest served at least two functions: to deter the collectors of rare birds’ eggs from stealing them in contravention of the law; and in order to find out more about the breeding habits of ospreys. (Incidentally, ‘birds or prey (raptor) persecution’ is one of six ‘Wildlife Crime Priorities’ listed by Police Scotland.)

Thus, COPFS is faced with the situation where the RSPB has covertly placed surveillance cameras on private land, probably at least partly with the aim of detecting individual instances of criminal behaviour and deterring other potential criminals from engaging in such behaviour in future. Thus, any evidence of a crime recorded by such cameras has been irregularly obtained and would require to be excused by a court before the recording could be admitted as evidence at a criminal trial. As I observed above, the actions by the RSPB are a breach of the right to privacy of both the estate owners and their employees (whilst not quite analogous, imagine if your neighbour installed a secret camera to record everything that went on in your garden). A court would have to determine that the public interest in preventing wildlife crime of the type in question is sufficient to outweigh the unauthorised and deliberate invasion of privacy by the RSPB before it would admit the recorded evidence. In the judgement of COPFS, the criminal courts would not do this and it seems to me that this is a perfectly reasonable view to take. In my view also, for what it is worth, I agree that the courts would not excuse such an irregularity in obtaining the video evidence and prosecutions would be fruitless. (On a more technical note, such video evidence might well also be rendered inadmissible under the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000.)

Hen Harrier
Photo credit: Gail Hampshire. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license

Legal Analysis: Factually Analysing Theresa’s Tough Talk on Terrorism, ‘Disruptive and Investigatory Powers’ and Human Rights.

This post is by Dr Phil Glover.

The recent tragic upsurge in terrorist activity in England has been accompanied by significant media and social media hyperbole. Stripping away the regrettable politicking and naked electioneering underpinning this is part of the exasperated academic lawyer’s job.

This short piece outlines and comments on current UK law as it stands surrounding one particular Theresa May statement made shortly after the dreadful terrorist murders in Manchester and London:

‘I’m clear: if human rights laws get in the way of tackling extremism and terrorism, we will change those laws to keep British people safe.’

Examples of the hyperbole that followed include the Guardian headline May: I’ll rip up human rights laws that impede new terror legislation and the Express headline I’ll ditch human rights laws to KICK OUT jihadis, says Theresa May in fight against terror. Election fervour meant the Prime Minister’s ‘if’ relating to ‘human rights laws’ became a manifesto-esque commitment to rip them up or ditch them.

We dull law scholars (I’m speaking for myself) prefer facts proven by evidence. A fundamental rule of evidence is that oral evidence tendered by the original source carries more weight than hearsay tendered by third parties. Hence the reason Theresa’s original statement is reprinted above. What she said was that ‘if human rights laws get in the way…’ not that they do.

For legal analysis purposes however (that’s what we do at Aberdeen), we firstly ask, ‘What laws tackle extremism and terrorism?’ We then ask, ‘What did Theresa May mean by ‘human rights laws?’ The legal question can then be framed as, ‘Do human rights laws get in the way of counter-extremism and counter-terrorism laws?’ A final question might then be, ‘Can Theresa May change human rights laws?

UK law ‘tackling extremism and terrorism’

If students were asked in an examination question along the lines of, ‘Describe the UK legislation that tackles extremism and counter-terrorism’, a good answer would be lengthy. Successive UK Governments since at least the era of IRA terrorism and the pre-internet incitement to hatred and violence era have generally been voted in on the back of tough political rhetoric about tackling these issues. This has seen an exponential mutation in the legislative frameworks regulating counter-terrorism, surveillance/information acquisition and prejudice-crime prevention. An examination-standard ‘statute by statute’ exposition is inappropriate for this forum, but thankfully the recent useful work of ‘jargonistas’ means that these huge State national security resources can be summarised as ‘disruptive and investigatory powers’ and ‘hate crime’ measures. The debatably equally useful ‘Transparency’ agenda also means that summaries of the relevant frameworks can be found in the Home Office, Disruptive and Investigatory Powers Transparency Report 2017.

It is somewhat surprising to law scholars to read of even an inference from a long-serving Home Secretary and latterly Prime Minister that human rights laws might ‘get in the way’ of terrorism legislation. Such legislation has largely been subject to robust independent review since 1978 and this has been enshrined in statute since 2005.

Although not explicitly tasked with assessing the tensions between ECHR considerations and counter-terrorism provisions, it is unthinkable that any of the senior legal counsel appointed to the role thus far has not advised successive governments and Home Office personnel as to where the correct balance requires to be struck. No independent reviewer has ever received public criticism from any government of any persuasion in this regard.

Indeed, such was the reputation for independence and quality of advice provided by David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer between 2011 and 2017) that he and his team were additionally asked to review (and now continue to review on a statutory basis) UK surveillance legislation following the 2013 Edward Snowden disclosures. His 2015 report ‘A Question of Trust’ was universally acclaimed and informed the drafting of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA). There is no little irony in the fact that this Act constituted a ‘transparent’ consolidation, expansion and entrenchment of all the previously disparate and occasionally secret state surveillance powers that Snowden et al sought to roll back. There is further irony in the fact that the IPA 2016 (heartily sponsored and endorsed by Theresa May) faces a significant legal challenge on the basis that it disproportionately infringes ECHR rights, yet may now constitute part of the counter extremism and counter-terrorism framework she feels is constrained by human rights considerations! This may be because of the nascent (and somewhat ill-informed) policy of attaching blame for terrorism and extremism on internet service providers, despite the existence of huge internet surveillance powers in the IPA 2016 and its inherent compelled compliance requirements placed on those companies controlling communications infrastructure.

Counter-terrorism and extremism legislation is reinforced by CONTEST, the UK Government Counter-terrorism Strategy (available here).  It is extremely difficult to see how, in legal terms, any aspect of UK human rights legislation impedes this use of ‘soft power’.

UK ‘Human Rights laws’

Law students at Aberdeen soon become au fait with the factual reality of the UK being a signatory to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] which, since October 2000, has legal effect in the UK via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This requires that ‘so far as it is possible to do so, [UK] primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’. Where it cannot be so read, declarations of incompatibility may be made.

This generally means that UK residents can potentially rely on the UK courts to protect their individual rights, and where disruptive and investigatory powers (discussed above) such as the infamous, post 9/11, Anti-Terrorism, Crime And Security Act 2001 (ATCASA) section 23 (powers enabling indefinite detention of terrorist suspects) are brought to judicial review, as in A & Others v Home Secretary (2004), UK courts have not held back from doing so.

Yet sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act are open to potential criticism in that they deal with a retrospective approach to ensuring that UK law, as enacted, complies with the ECHR. Indeed the example above meant that the ATCASA 2001 had been in place for three years before the House of Lords declared s23 incompatible. Politicians behind the enactment of such powers (like Mrs May) might therefore feel justified in criticising the HRA for enabling the retrospective undermining of their parliamentary sovereignty and legislative scrutiny (other public law student favourites) as part of the separation of powers.

Closer scrutiny of the HRA however, shows that it also places a prospective approach to Parliamentary procedure, in that section 19 mandates (without exception) a Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill passing through both Houses of Parliament, before second reading of the Bill, to (a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights (“a statement of compatibility”); or (b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.

On the surface therefore, given Theresa May’s roles in successive Governments since 2010, she has presided over the enactment of all counter terrorism and counter extremism legislation in that period, all of which has been signed off as human rights compliant in accordance with the HRA 1998, s19. Only surveillance legislation has been subject to significant retrospective human rights challenges from the privacy and civil libertarian lobby and this on the basis that, despite her Government signing the pre-Act Bill off as ECHR compatible and it receiving Royal Assent, the final Act infringes ECHR rights such as Article 8. There has never been a challenge on the reverse basis, i.e. that human rights considerations actually impede the efficacy of an Act of Parliament.

I am not alone in finding no evidence whatsoever that human rights laws in any way get in the way of UK measures (statutory or otherwise) to counter extremism or terrorism. Given the strong chance of success of a legal challenge seeking to roll back some of the powers within the IPA 2016 on the basis of EU jurisprudence to date, only a fool would consider altering the single human rights law we have (the HRA 1998) to somehow ensure that counter extremism or counter terrorism powers can bite harder. Brexit means Brexit, but the UK remains in the ECHR. Mrs May appears no fool in the eyes of academic scrutiny, but although her remarks quoted herein may undoubtedly have been embellished by others for their own purposes, she may yet come to feel somewhat foolish for having made them in the first place. Politicians attack the laws they themselves drafted and enacted at their peril.

Reflections on “Land Rights and Land Responsibilities: An Audience with the Chair of the new Scottish Land Commission”

This blog post is by Malcolm Rudd, a recent Diploma in Professional Legal Practice graduate of the University of Aberdeen.

On 26 May 2017, the King’s Conference Centre at the University of Aberdeen hosted a lecture and panel discussion about Scotland’s land as part of the May Festival. This event built on a series of events that Malcolm Combe (a Lecturer at the School of Law) and colleagues at the University of Aberdeen have hosted on the topic of land reform, as digested on this blog.

Making More of Scotland's Land
(L-R): Anne-Michelle Slater; Andrew McCornick; Annie McKee; Malcolm Combe; Andrew Thin.

Andrew Thin, Chair of the Scottish Land Commission (Coimisean Fearainn Na H-Alba), provided the keynote presentation. He introduced that new body, which became fully operational on 1 April 2017, and said a few words about the forthcoming Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement, before considering what it and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 could mean for the management, use and regulation of land in Scotland.

The Scottish Land Commission was established under Part 2 of the new legislation. It is a Non-Parliamentary Departmental Body (or “Quango”), not completely independent of the Scottish Government but somewhat distanced. There are five land commissioners and one tenant farming commissioner with a range of experience and expertise of business, planning, science and public service.

Andrew Thin’s presentation was entitled “Making More of Scotland’s Land”. The principle of “more for more”, it was explained, will underpin the work of the Commission. Not “more” merely in the traditional sense of productivity, but in bringing greater benefits from the land to more of Scotland’s people. The forthcoming Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement, which is provided for in Part 1 of the 2016 Act, is intended to balance rights and responsibilities relating to land using a human rights based approach. The Scottish Government recently consulted on the contents of the Statement, and the Commission’s response (PDF) to that noted anxiety about ambiguity of language and lack of clarity of outcomes. Thin then outlined that the Commission’s role is to encourage flourishing communities, minimise dispute and pursue more diverse and disaggregated land ownership. Its strategic plan for 2018-2021 and some Codes of Practice relating to tenant farming (with agricultural tenancies being an ongoing issue for rural Scotland) will not be released until after the General Election on 8 June 2017.

Following Thin’s address members of an expert panel (reflecting sectoral, geographical and planning expertise) each contributed their perspective on the Statement and land reform policy.

The panel, led by Malcolm Combe, comprised:

Andrew McCornick, President of NFU Scotland
Dr Annie McKee, Social researcher in land management, The James Hutton Institute
Anne-Michelle Slater, Head of School, University of Aberdeen School of Law

Anne-Michelle Slater spoke first, addressing the role which planning law could play in land reform. Andrew McCornick raised his concern as to the perceived unclear trajectory of land reform. He explained that many farmers (both tenants and owners) felt overburdened by bureaucracy and were suspicious of what could be a threat to current land-based activities. Annie McKee focussed on community engagement and transparency in her contribution.

The audience were given an opportunity to ask questions and hear the response of the panel. Wide ranging discussion followed. There were questions about environmental matters, including biodiversity and water quality. Linked to this was land use, in particular forestry and deer management, and there was discussion about tenant farming (and the recent review of it) and the problem of rural community depopulation. One audience member, Professor Roderick Paisley of the School of Law, used the example of a farmer whose ownership allowed him to stay on land earmarked for the Trump International Golf Links to highlight the protective role that property rights can play. The questions were somewhat rural in focus, but it should be borne in mind that land reform policy also affects urban Scotland, that being a point Thin made in his presentation. Thin also stressed the Commission’s intent to engage with communities across Scotland (indeed, only the night before, such an event was held at Thainstone Mart in Inverurie).

The development of land reform in Scotland has been gradual. It will be fascinating to see the effect of the Scottish Land Commission and the Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement on the relationship between Scotland’s people and Scotland’s land. Perhaps this event, and indeed this blog post, might play a small role in highlighting that development.

To follow the event as it happened, relevant tweets from the @RuralLaw account can be found here.

Malcolm Rudd has recently worked as a research assistant at the School of Law, looking at aspects of land law with Malcolm Combe, with the support of the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. He presented a paper on land reform and succession (inheritance) at a conference on 26 August 2016, also at the University of Aberdeen.